

TOP SECRET

6 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 6 August 1969

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25X1 DD/I noted receipt of a CINCPAC invitation transmitted via DIA to participate in a two-phase analysis of Vietnam OB. He added that [ ] of OCI will participate.

Godfrey noted completion and distribution of an OCI memorandum on Black Radicalism in the Caribbean.

DD/S related that on Monday morning at the entrance to the Agency area in the vicinity of Route 123 a Volkswagen was seen whose occupants were seen recording license plates. He added that they have determined upon investigation that William Blum on the staff of the Quicksilver Times was one of those recording license numbers. The Director called Goodwin's attention to an item relating to himself which appeared in a recent issue of the Quicksilver Times.

Maury briefed on favorable Congressional support precipitated by their work with Larry Conrad on an amendment to the Ervin bill (see Morning Meeting Minutes of 5 August).

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Maury noted plans under way to brief Senator Bayh prior to his European/Soviet trip.

Houston noted that he spent two hours yesterday with a law student summer intern program and that his session with them went well.

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DDCI noted that he met with Admirals Moorer and Lowrance and reported that both are interested in who can be appropriately named as Froehlke's deputy.

\*The Director asked the DD/S to try to identify the employee who he has observed several mornings walking up the sidewalk in the vicinity of the Southwest Parking Lot in an apparent state of poor health.

The Director called the DD/S&T's attention to the items in today's Washington Post and New York Times on Dr. Foster's testimony with respect to American and Soviet MIRV's. [REDACTED]

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The Director briefed on his meeting yesterday with Elliot Richardson, U. Alexis Johnson, and David Packard. He expressed the hope that this meeting may produce some policy decisions being made in the future with respect to our commitments and presence overseas which will act as a guide for effecting personnel reductions.

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*for* L. K. White

\*Extracted and sent to action officer

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# PENTAGON THINKS SOVIET TESTS MIRV

Science Chief Says 3-Part  
Warheads Could Be Put  
on Missiles During '70

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 5—The Pentagon's chief scientist told Congress today that in his opinion the Soviet Union was testing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's) capable of attacking three separate Minuteman missiles and should be able to start installing such warheads on its missiles during the last half of next year.

This is the first time that a senior Administration official had made such a public assertion regarding three-part Soviet warheads, each part of which can be independently directed to a target.

The scientist, Dr. John S. Foster Jr., director of research and engineering for the Defense Department, said that American MIRV's did not endanger the strategic balance of power, while the Soviet MIRV's did. The difference, he said, is that such American weapons are not powerful enough to attack Soviet missiles effectively in underground silos.

While speaking in favor of a ban on the deployment of MIRV's in both countries as part of a comprehensive arms control agreement, Dr. Foster cautioned against a premature moratorium on the testing of such systems. It would be too easy for the Russians to get around a testing ban, either with clandestine space shots or

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with tests on the ground that could not be detected, he said.

Dr. Foster testified behind closed doors before the subcommittee on National Security Policy of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which is looking into the advisability of a ban on MIRV tests. His formal remarks were released at the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill.

While his testimony was designed to inform Congress of the Pentagon's concern about a MIRV testing ban prior to the start of strategic arms limitation talks it also could influence tomorrow's crucial vote in the Senate on the Administration's proposal to build the Safeguard antiballistic missile system to protect a portion of the nation's Minuteman force from surprise attack.

The Administration has contended that the Soviet SS-9 missile could be used to attempt a first strike against the United States. The opponents of Safeguard have argued, among other things, that no clear-cut case has yet been presented that the Soviet Union was seeking such a capability.

## Avoided Specifying Goal

Before today's testimony, both President Nixon and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird had stated that Soviet warhead tests in the Pacific showed the Soviet Union seemed to be working to develop the ability to attack three Minutemen with a three-part warhead on the

SS-9 missile. However, both Dr. Foster and other officials said that Soviet multiple warheads could be individually guided, or were built simply to disperse in such a pattern as to cover conveniently three dispersed Minutemen silos and one general area.

Dr. Foster conceded that intelligence reports on the recent Pacific tests were inconclusive on the question. But he added: "My own judgment in this matter is that the Soviet triplet [three-part warhead] is a MIRV and that it had little other function than the attack of large numbers of hard targets."

It is understood that his statement was cleared at the highest level in the Pentagon and elsewhere in the Government.

## Retaliatory Mission

Dr. Foster said the American MIRV's were designed to penetrate a potentially heavy Soviet defense to destroy Russian cities in retaliation for a Russian first strike on the United States.

He disclosed that nine of each of the Poseidon and Minuteman-3 MIRV's had been "highly successful" and that the United States would be in a position to start deployment sometime after the completion of current test programs next May.

Soviet multiple warhead tests also have been "very successful," he said.

From other sources it was learned that each warhead in the Poseidon missile had the power of about 30 kilotons, the Minuteman about 200 kilotons, and the SS-9 about four or five megatons. A kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT; a megaton to one million tons.

Discussing the difference be-

tween the two nations' systems, Dr. Foster said: "The capability and the purpose of MIRV's are against the Soviet defenses, and the capability of their MIRV's appears to be against our Minuteman."

Since the United States believes its ability to deter nuclear war on having enough missiles to make a first strike, penetrate Soviet defenses and destroy Russian cities, Dr. Foster said the Soviet MIRV "must be considered as a destabilizing influence on the strategic balance."

He also told the subcommittee that shotgun type warheads were carried by American submarines, but that these were not independently targeted the MIRV's.

# Russia Seen Deploying MIRV in '70

By Richard Homan  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Defense Department's research director said yesterday that he believes Russia has developed and will have deployed by late next year a multiple-warhead missile with "little other function" than a hostile first strike.

Testifying on the eve of the Senate vote on the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, Dr. John S. Foster Jr. told a House subcommittee that the United States could exercise a "stabilizing influence" on the arms race by continuing with its plans to begin deploying MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) warheads by mid-1970.

Foster's assessment of Russian missile capabilities went beyond those of Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and CIA Director Richard Helms.

Both have told Congress that the latest tests last spring of the Soviet SS-9 missile, which has three warheads, left in doubt whether Russian has developed independent-targeting capability or is simply using multiple warheads fired shotgun fashion.

"My own judgment in this matter is that the Soviet triplet probably is a MIRV and that it has little other function than the attack of large numbers of hard targets," Foster said.

In nuclear planning, attacks on hard targets—the opposition's heavily protected missile sites—are the essential element of a first strike.

"While they have not yet shown in flight tests all the performance necessary to demonstrate that fact to us, they may wish to deny us such information," Foster said.

"If they do intend to deny us this information, the nature of the mechanization is such that they may be able to do so while completing the development of a MIRV system to their satisfaction . . .

"The Soviets have conducted a number of tests of their SS-9 triplet and have apparently also had a very successful test program. Based on the Soviet's past pattern of testing and deployment, I would assume that they, under normal circumstances, would be ready to deploy the SS-9 triplet some time in the latter half of next year."

Testifying before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that is considering a resolution calling for suspension of U.S. testing and deployment of MIRV, Foster argued that there is a vast difference be-

tween U.S. and Russian MIRV weapons.

The Russian warheads are about five megatons and the U.S. warheads about 0.2 megatons.

Because of the small warheads, Foster said, MIRV "will not add significantly to the American ability to destroy hardened Soviet weapons" and cannot be considered a first-strike weapon.

Laird, however, has told Congress frequently that the MIRV being tested for U.S. Poseidon submarines "is an important program since it promises to improve the accuracy of the Poseidon missile, thus enhancing its effectiveness against hard targets."

The U.S. MIRV is "designed to enhance our deterrent posture through ability to penetrate Soviet ABM defenses of their cities" to strike

population centers in second strike retaliation, Foster said.

"It does not threaten the Soviet ICBMs which constitute their deterrent. Therefore, I believe that the U.S. MIRV must be considered as a stabilizing influence since it preserves our deterrent while not threatening theirs."

The Russian MIRV, he said, "could be effective against Minuteman, which is part of our deterrent, while fulfilling no need in the Soviet deterrent posture . . . Consequently, I believe that the Soviet multiples must be considered as a destabilizing influence on the strategic balance."

Foster said the United States is about mid-way in its MIRV test program. Testing is scheduled to be completed next May "with first deployment following closely thereafter," he said.

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Washington, D. C., Quicksilver Tim  
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"Thank you, Mr. Chairman." 99

WASH., D.C. (LNS)--(As a public service we reprint in full the newly released testimony of Richard Helms, director of the CIA, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 23, 1969.

Senator Fulbright and other opponents of the ABM boondoggle which Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is trying to bully through Congress, had invited both Laird and Helms to a hearing to ask them both a few questions. They wanted to know how Laird could assert, "based on the data furnished by our intelligence community," that "with their nuclear tonnage", the Soviets are clearly going for development of an attack force with first strike capability - while Helms had made it known just a few days later that the CIA had gathered no evidence whatsoever that the Russians were tooling up for a nuclear first strike against the U.S.

The Committee asked Helms a number of pointed questions about his disagreements with Mr. Laird, and just who (if not both) was lying. Here are Helms answers in full.)

The Chairman (Fulbright): The

intelligence community, as represented by the Director...had not made a finding that the Soviet Union was going for a first strike capability. Is that not correct, Mr. Helms; did you not so testify?

Mr. Helms: (deleted)

Chairman: Now there is agreement, I think, within the intelligence community that by 1975 (the Russians) could have about 400 SS-9s (missiles) with three independently targeted reentry vehicles.

Mr. Helms: (deleted)

Sen. Mundt: I would like to know whether the SS-11 is any better than the SS-9.

Mr. Helms: (deleted)

Chairman: Is it not true that the intelligence community believes that the Soviets cut back their development of Galosh (the Russian ABM) because they recognized it could not cope adequately with our offensive capability?

Mr. Helms: (deleted)

Chairman: That was one you gave to the committee.

Mr. Helms: (deleted)

Security deletions in public testimony are the province of the Department of Defense. Senator Fulbright (let alone you or I) has nothing to say about the matter. It is interesting to note in this instance that the deletions have nothing to do with U.S. military capacity (which Laird talks about quite freely) but with Russian capacity and with the disagreements between Laird and Helms. Now are we to suppose that the Pentagon is deleting this material on Russian capacity to keep the Russians from getting their hands on it? or is the purpose of security deletions to keep the Pentagon secure from the American people?

Mr. Laird states coyly in his epistulary preface to the hearings that, "no conclusions, one way or the other should be drawn from the printed testimony..."

There was only one portion of Helms' testimony that was not deleted. This testimony follows in full:

Chairman: Thank you very much, both of you.

Mr. Helms: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.